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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1972, in an effort to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters,"' Congress amended the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA),2 commonly called the

* Thank you to Professor Alyson Flournoy for introducing me to this topic and to James
Kloss for his helpful suggestions throughout the writing of this Note.
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2001).
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified
as amended at33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2001)).
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Clean Water Act (CWA), by, among other things, enacting section 404,4
a federal permit program designed to regulate the discharge of dredged or
fill material into the "waters of the United States."' Specifically, under
section 301 of the CWA,6 the "discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigablewatersat specified disposal sites"7 is forbidden without a section
404(a) permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps).'
However, "navigable waters," "the controlling phrase in defining the
[jurisdictional] scope of the Clean Water Act,"'9 is vaguely defined as
"waters of the United States, including the territorial seas."'" As a result,
the Corps' interpretation of its jurisdiction pursuant to the definition of
"navigable waters," has, on occasion, been challenged."
Recently, in Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers (SWANCC),' 2 the Supreme Court retreated from its only other
decision addressing the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction under section
404(a). " In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 4 the Court
held that the Corps' interpretation of "navigable waters" under section
404(a), including wetlands adjacent to waters of the United States, was

3. JoHN P. DWYER& MARKA F. BERGSUND, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS ANNOTATED

743 (2000).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2001).
5. Id. (setting forth section 404(a)'s permitprogram); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2001) (defining
"navigable waters" as "waters of the United States").
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2001).
7. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2001) (emphasis added).
8. The section 404(a) permit is subject to guidelines established in conjunction with the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the veto authority of the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(c). For a more detailed discussion about the EPA's and Corps' jurisdictional relationship, see
MargaratN. Strand, FederalWetlands Law, reprintedin WETLANDS DESKBOOK 11 (2d ed. 1997).
For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to note that the EPA and the Corps both have the
authority to interpret "waters of the United States" pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2001) and that
both agencies share the same definition of "waters of the United States." Compare 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(a) (2001) (indicating the Corps' definition), with 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(a) (2001) (indicating the
EPA's definition).
9. United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 727 (3d Cir. 1993).
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2001).
11. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 158, 162-69 (2001);
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123-26 (1985); United States v.
Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 255-58 (4th Cir. 1997); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388,
1390-92 (9th Cir. 1995); Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 999 F.2d 256,257-60
(7th Cir. 1993); Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 725-28; Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 803-04 (10th Cir.
1984); United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209-11 (7th Cir. 1979); Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp.
655, 668-72 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
12. 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (hereinafter SWANCC).
13. Id. at 176-77; see also Riverside, 474 U.S. at 135.
14. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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within the scope of the CWA.' In SWANCC, however, contrary to
Riverside, the Court held that the Corps' statutory interpretation of its
jurisdiction 6 was not within the scope of the CWA."7
Thus, contrary to federal case law,"8 the Court effectively limited the
Corps' assertion of jurisdiction under section 404(a) and invalidated the
Corps' "migratory bird rule,"' 9 as applied to "[ajl other waters such as
intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats,
sandflats, wetlands..., the use, degradation or destruction of which could
affect interstate orforeign commerce."2 As a result, the Court potentially
removed twenty percent of the "waters of the United States" from the
scope of the Corps' regulatory authority.2'
The effect, however, is more substantial than just a limitation on the
Corps' regulatory authority. For example, intrastate wetlands, which are
now vulnerable to less regulated dredging and filling, not only provide
habitat for migratory birds and other wildlife, but also provide, among
other things, flood control and water filtering futctions.22 Thus, the
destruction of intrastate wetlands will affect the available habitat for
migratory birds and other wildlife, and, at least on a local level, flood
control and water quality.
In light of SWANCC, this Note addresses the Corps' jurisdiction to
regulate "[a]ll other waters"23 under the CWA and proposes an amendment
to ensure the Corps' jurisdiction over "all other waters." Part II of this Note
briefly describes the history of the Corps' interpretation of its jurisdiction
over "navigable waters" under section 404(a). Part III considers the Corps'
"Migratory Bird Rule" 24 and the courts' expansive readings of section
404(a) jurisdiction. Part IV contrasts Part III by considering the Court's
recent restrictive reading of section 404(a). Part V addresses the scope of

15. Id.
16. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2001) (defining "waters of the United States"); Final Rule for
Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986)
(introducing the "migratory bird rule").
17. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162.
18. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 131-39; Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1394-96
(9th Cir. 1995); Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 999 F.2d 256,260-62 (7th Cir.

1993).
19. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs, 51 Fed. Reg. at 41,217.
3 (Commerce
20. 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(3) (emphasis added); see alsoU.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.

Clause).
21. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Bar Wide U.S. Role Under the Clean Waters Act, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2001, at Al3.
22. Elaine Bueschen, Comment, Do Isolated Wetlands Substantially Affect Interstate
Commerce?, 46 AM1. U. L. REV.931, 953-59 (1997); see also Greenhouse, supranote 21, at A13
(quoting the Administrator of the United States EPA).

23. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).
24. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs, 51 Fed. Reg. at 41,217.
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the Corps' section 404(a) jurisdiction in light of SWANCC, which is
sympathetic to both the courts' expansive and restrictive interpretations.
Finally, Part VI offers an amendment to the CWA and Part VII offers a
conclusion.
II.

HISTORY OF THE CORPS' INTERPRETATION OF
"NAVIGABLE WATERS"

A. InitialRestrictive Reading
The legislative history of the CWA and the Corps' own interpretation
of its scope are necessary for defining the limit of "waters of the United
' Originally, the Corps exercised its jurisdiction under section
States."25
404(a) to only those waters that were "subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide, and/or are presently, or have been in the past, or may be in the future
susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce. 2 6 That
is, initially, under section 404(a), the Corps did not exercise jurisdiction
adjacent to navigable waters or non-adjacent, intrastate
over wetlands
27
waters.
The Corps' initial limited exercise of jurisdiction reflected its actual
limited jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA).28 Congress,
however, in enacting the 1972 amendments, did not intend to limit the
Corps' jurisdiction to "navigable waters" as defined by the RHA.29 In fact,
in a Conference Report for the 1972 amendments, the conferees stated that
they "fully intend that the term 'navigable waters' be given the broadest

25. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2001) (defining "navigable waters" as "waters of the United
States"); see also Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 166-72 (2001)
(interpreting the meaning of "waters of the United States"); United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135-39 (1985) (interpreting the meaning of "waters of the United
States").
26. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (1974). In subsequent regulations the Corps has retained this
definition. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1).
27. Compare 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1), with 33 C.F.R. § 328.3.
28. See 33 U.S.C. § 401 (2001); 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2001); 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000); see also
Navigation and Navigable Waters, 37 Fed. Reg. 18,289, 18,289-90 (Sept. 9, 1972) (offering a
definition for "navigable waters" under the RHA substantially similar to 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1)
(1974)); RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.6(C) (2d ed. 1993); Sam Kalen, Commerce to
Conservation:The CallforaNationalWaterPolicyandtheEvolution ofFederalJurisdictionOver
Wetlands, 69 N.D. L. REV. 873, 880,886 (1993); W. Christian Hoyer, Corps ofEngineers Dredge
and FillJurisdiction:Buttressing a Citadel UnderSiege, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 19, 21 (1973).
29. See RODGERS,supranote 28, at § 4.6(c). Specifically, "[s]ubsection 502(7) [ofthe CWA,
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2001)] defines 'navigable waters' to mean 'the waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas,' thus strongly suggesting the banishment of the navigability
limitation." Id.
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possible constitutional interpretation."3 And, in UnitedStatesv. Holland,3
a case decided shortly after the adoption ofthe 1972 amendments, the court
held that Congress intended to "define away the old 'navigability'
'
restriction."32
Specifically, in Holland, the court held that by omitting the term
"navigable" from the definition of "navigable waters" Congress intended
to eliminate the traditional navigability restriction." The court held that
although the "mean high water line" had been traditionally used to
demarcate federal authority over coastal areas, it could not be used to
create a barrier to the protection of "ecosystems which the [CWA] is
' The court reasoned that because under the CWA
intended to protect."34
Congress intended to protect the "nations waters," pollutants introduced
into the "nations waters," although not originating in waters below the
mean high water line, could be regulated under the CWA.3 s
B. Expansionof the 1974 Interpretation
The Corps' limited 1974 interpretation was promptly challenged in
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway.36 In Callaway, the
court held that Congress intended an expansive assertion of federal
jurisdiction under section 404(a). 7 Specifically, the court held that
Congress intended to assert "federal jurisdiction over the nation's waters
to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution"38 and that the term "navigable waters" was "not limited to
the traditional tests of navigability."39 The court therefore held that the
Corps' limited exercise of'jurisdiction40 was unlawful.4 '
In response to the Callaway decision, the Corps expanded its scope of
authority ufider section 404(a).42 In 1975, to become effective in three
'
separate phases, the Corps defined "navigable waters."43

30. S. CoNF. REFP. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972).
31. 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
32. Id. at 671-74 (quotations in original).
33. Id. at 671; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2001) (defining the term "navigable waters").
34. Holland, 373 F. Supp. at 675-76.
35. Id. at 673-77.
36. 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
41. Callaway,392 F. Supp. at 686.
42. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,325,31,325-26 (July 25, 1975); see also Kalen, supranote 28, at 893-98
(discussing the adoption of the Corps' expansive interpretations of "navigable waters").
43. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 184 (2001) (Stevens,
J. dissenting) (citing and quoting 40 Fed. Reg. 31,325-26 (1975)).
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[P]hase 1, which became effective immediately,
encompassed, the navigable waters covered by the 1974
regulations and the RHA; phase 2, effective after July 1,
1976, [included] nonnavigable tributaries, freshwater
wetlands adjacent to primary navigable waters, and lakes; and
phase 3, effective after July 1, 1977, [included] all other
waters not covered by phase 1 and 2 (such as 'intermittent
rivers, streams, tributaries, and perched wetlands that are not
contiguous or adjacent to navigable waters')."
The Corps revised and finalized its 1975 regulations in 1977, 4' but the
scope of "navigable waters" remained, and continues to remain,
substantially the same.46
The Corps' expansive 1975 and 1977 interpretations of its section
404(a) jurisdiction prompted a House proposal to limit the definition of
"navigable waters," as defined as "waters of the United States," to mean
those waters that are or could potentially be used for interstate or foreign
commerce and their adjacent wetlands. 47 The proposed bill forced debate
on the issue in the House48 and Senate,49 but the bill ultimately failed in the
Senate." The 1977 amendments to the CWA, therefore, retained the
original definition of "navigable waters."'" As a result, it is arguable that
the "extensive debate [and failure to amend the definition] was a
endorsement of the position that the Corps maintains
congressional
52
today.19

44. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing and quoting 40 Fed. Reg. 31,325-26 (1975) (emphasis
added)); see also Kalen, supra note 28, at 893-98 (discussing the "three phase initiative").
45. Permits for Discharges of Dredged or Filled Material into Waters of the United States,
42 Fed. Reg. 37,127, 37,144 (July 19, 1977) (codified as amended, 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (1982), §
328.3 (2001)).
46. ComparePermits for Discharges, 42 Fed. Reg. at 37,144, with 40 Fed. Reg. at 31,325-26
and 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2001). The major distinction is that in the 1977 regulations "the Corps
incorporated the phrase 'waters of the United States' for implementing the 404[(a)] program (to
distinguish it from Sections 9 and 10 of the RHA), and it consolidated into four categories the list
ofjurisdictional waters previously identified in the 1975 regulations?' Kalen, supranote 28, at 896.
47. H.R. 3199, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., § 16 (1977).
48. 123 Cong. Rec..10,426-34 (1977).
49. Id. at 26,701-28.
50. Id. at 26,728. CompareFederal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972), with Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat.
1566 (1977).
51. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. at 1606-07.
52. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 186 (2001) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Compare id. at 168-71 (holding that the Corps presented insufficient evidence to
sustain a finding that Congress acquiesced), with United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121, 135-39 (1985) (holding that Congress acquiesced to the Corps' interpretation).
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In any event, in 1986 the Corps continued to exercise its expansive
jurisdiction under section 404(a) by adopting the "Migratory Bird Rule"
(MBR) 3 In an effort to justify its jurisdiction over "all other waters,"'54
including intrastate wetlands "which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce,"55 the Corps stated that its jurisdiction extends to those waters:
a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds
protected by Migratory Bird Treaties; or
b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other
migratory birds which cross state lines; or
c. Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered
species; or
d. Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce. 6
The MBR effectively expanded the Corps definition of "all other waters."
That is, under "all other waters," the Corps included such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign
travelers for recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and
sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used 57for industrial
purpose by industries in interstate commerce.
Thus, pursuant to the MBR, "all other waters" which were or could be used
by migratory birds could be regulated under section 404(a) as "waters of
the United States."
Initially, the courts upheld the MBR in Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. United
States Environmental Protection Agency,"8 where the court ruled that
migratory birds served as a sufficient nexus to connect "all other waters"
to interstate commerce.5 9 Recently, however, the MBR has been
invalidated by the Supreme Court.6" Specifically, in SWANCC, the Court
held that the MBR was not within the scope of the CWA.6 Thus, at a

53. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206,
41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).

54. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2001).
55. Id.; see discussion of wetlands infranote 135 and accompanying text.
56. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs, 51 Fed. Reg. at 41,217.

57. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)(i)-(iii).
58. 999 F.2d 256, 260-61 (7th Cir. 1993).

59. Id.
60. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001)
(holding that the MBR, as applied to reach "petitioner's balefill site [other waters] exceeds the
authority granted to [the Corps]").
61. Id.
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minimum, it is accepted that the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction extends
beyond the traditional definition of "navigable waters, '62 but the full
breadth of the Corps' jurisdiction, specifically over "all other waters,"
remains debatable.63
III. AN EXAMINATION OF EXPANSIVE JUDICIAL READINGS
Since the enactment ofthe CWA, the Corps' exercise of its jurisdiction
pursuant to section 404(a) has been challenged. ' In such cases, the courts
are generally asked to decide two issues: one, whether the area that the
Corps is attempting to assert jurisdiction over fits within the Corps'
definition of "waters of the United States;"65 and two, whether the Corps'
exercise of jurisdiction is within the scope of the CWA.6 6 This Note
specifically addresses two parts ofthe latter issue: one, whether the Corps'
exercise ofjurisdiction is consistent with the Commerce Clause; and two,
whether the Corps' exercise ofjurisdiction is consistent with the intent of
the CWA.
A. Jurisdictionand the Commerce Clause
1. Connection to Interstate Commerce
Shortly after the enactment of the CWA, it became clear that the
Commerce Clause was going to be a controlling factor in the Corps'
exercise of section 404(a) jurisdiction.67 In United States v. Holland,the
Corps sought to enjoin defendants from depositing fill material into manmade mosquito canals and mangrove wetland areas connected to a bayou
of Tampa Bay, without a section 404(a) permit.68 Defendants argued that
their fill activities did not require a permit because the areas being filled
were non-navigable and that the Corps' jurisdiction did not extend to nonnavigable waters.69
62. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131-36 (1985); Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v.
Holland, 373 F. Supp. 655, 671-72 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
63. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also Elizabeth Ann Glass Geltman,
Regulation of Non-Adjacent Wetlands Under Section 404 of the Clean WaterAct, 23 NEW ENG. L.

REV. 615, 641-43 (1989) (discussing whether the Corps' section 404 jurisdiction under the CWA
extends to non-adjacent wetlands).
64. See supra note I I and accompanying text; see also Geltman, supra note 63, at 641-43.
65. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2001) (defining "waters of the United States"); Riverside, 474 U.S.
at 126-32; Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d at 260; Holland, 373 F. Supp. at 668.
66. See supra note 11.
67. Callaway,392 F. Supp. at 686; Holland, 373 F. Supp. at 671.

68. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. at 667-68.
69. Id. at 669.
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In Holland,the district court first discussed the Corps' traditionally
limited scope of regulatory authority under the RHA70 and then
distinguished it from the newly enacted CWA. 71 The court held that unlike
the RHA, Congress did not limit the CWA to the "traditional tests of
navigability."' Specifically, the court stated that although the term
"navigable waters" is used in section 404(a), the definition provided by
Congress lacks any "navigability" requirement.73 In fact, the court stated
that the definition of "navigable waters" in the CWA "stands with no
limiting language."7 4 Rather, the court held that "the sole limitation on the
reach of federal power [under the CWA is] the commerce clause." 75 Thus,
after concluding that "the waters of the mosquito canals were within [the]
definition of 'waters of the United States,"' 76 the court held that, since "[i]t
is beyond question that water pollution has a serious effect on interstate
commerce," ' 7 defendants' non-permitted "filling activities on land
periodically inundated by tidal waters constituted"" a violation of section

3017."

Shortly after Holland,in UnitedStatesv. Byrd,"0 the Corps' jurisdiction
over "all other waters" was challenged.8" Respondent Byrd argued that the
Corps' exercise of jurisdiction over an isolated lake and its adjacent
wetlands fell outside the scope of the Commerce Clause. 2 Specifically,
Byrd argued that the use of the lake by interstate travelers failed to

70.
71.
72.
73.
seas." 33
74.

Id at 669-71.
Id. at 671.
Id.
Id. "Navigable waters" are defined as "waters of the United States, including territorial
U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1974).
Holland,373 F. Supp. at 671.

75. Id. at671.
76. Id. at 673-74.

77. Id. at 673.
78. Id at 676. Before concluding that the defendants violated section 301, the court
established, among others, the following facts:
4.... (a) Most of [defendants'] property is interlaced with artificial mosquito

canals containing water. (b) The water in the mosquito canal is connected to
Papy's Bayou.... 7. Continued discharge would result in irreparable injury, loss
and damage to the aquatic ecosystem of Papy's Bayou and to the commercial and
sport fisheries which are dependent upon the estuaries of the Gulf of Mexico.

Id. at 667-68.
79.
required
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 676. Section 301 makes it unlawful to fill without a permit, when a permit is
under section 404(a). 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(a) (1974).
609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1209-11.
Id. at 1209.
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establish a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce. s3 The Seventh Circuit
held, however, that "[tihe recreational use of inland lakes has a significant
impact on interstate commerce." Thus, the court held that the Corps'
jurisdiction over the intrastate lake was within the scope of the CWA.85
The court held, therefore, that the Corps' regulations over "all other
waters" was consistent with the congressional intent of the CWA. s6
In light of Holland and Byrd, it is therefore clear that the Corps,
pursuant to section 404(a), may regulate "all other waters" that are
connected to interstate commerce, by, for example, interstate travelers.
2. Effect on Interstate Commerce
In 1979, Utah also tested the scope of the Corps' section 404(a)
jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause.87 In Utah v. Marsh, the Corps
exercised its jurisdiction over Utah Lake, a lake located solely within the
territory of Utah and with no navigable tributaries or outlets "extending
beyond the borders of the State." 8 The Corps argued that the "isolated,"
"intrastate" lake fell within its definition of "waters of the United States,"
under "all other waters," including "isolatedwetlands and lakes ...the
degradationor destructionof which could affect interstate commerce." 9
The Corps justified its jurisdiction on the grounds that the lake affected
interstate commerce because it was used by interstate travelers, its waters
were used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce, and its waters were
used by migratory birds.9"
Procedurally, after informing the Utah Division ofParks and Recreation
that its erection of a dam and the subsequent disposal of its construction
materials into the lake without a section 404(a) permit violated the CWA,
the State filed a complaint challenging the Corps' regulatory authority
under the CWA.9" The State argued that "the reach of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause does not extend to Utah Lake because that
lake has no navigable connection in interstate commerce and the lake, by
itself, does not affect interstate commerce."92 To the contrary, the Tenth
Circuit held that consistent with Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to promote

83. Id.
84. Id. at 1210.
85. Id. at 1210-11.

86. Id.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1984).
Id.
Id. at 802 n.4 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a) (1978)) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 801.
Id.
Id. at 803.
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and regulate interstate commerce, including "'local activities in both the
States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and
harmful effect upon that commerce."' 93 Thus, applying the "substantial
economic effect doctrine,"94 the court held that the State's discharge into
Utah Lake without a section 404(a) permit violated section 301 because the
discharge "could well have a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce."" Specifically, the court reasoned that the use of the lake to
irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce, as a warm water fishery, for
recreational activities (including fishing, boating, and camping), and the
fact that the "lake is on the flyway of several species of migratory
waterfowl," justified the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over Utah Lake
as consistent with the Commerce Clause satisfying the necessary nexus to
interstate commerce.96
Similar to Marsh, in UnitedStates v. Pozsgai,9' the Third Circuit was
asked to interpret the scope ofthe Corps' jurisdiction under the Commerce
Clause. 98 Defendants, charged with violating section 301 for failure to
fill material into wetlands adjacent to
obtain a permit before discharging
"waters of the United States,"99 argued that the Corps lacked jurisdiction
without establishing a "site-specific impact on interstate commerce. ' '
The court held, however, unlike Marsh, which addressed the Corps'
regulation of an intrastate lake, the Corps' provision defining "adjacent"
wetlands does not require a "site-specific impact" on interstate
commerce.' In reaching its holding, the court first adopted the standard
of review from Hodelv. VirginiaSurface Mining & ReclamationAss 'n.'02

93. Id. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964))
(emphasis added).
94. Id. at 803. In UnitedStates v. Lopez, the Court held that in order for a regulated activity
to fall under the scope of the Commerce Clause, the activity must: one, be connected to an
economic activity; and two, have asubstantial effect on interstate commerce. 514 U.S. 549,561-63,
559-60 (1995); see also Bueschen, supra note 22, at 949-54 (discussing the "Lopez" Commerce
Clause analysis). With respect to the "economic activity" requirement, a strong case can be made
that the regulation of wetlands, especially isolated wetlands, will generally satisfy the first prong
of Lopez. Id. at 950-54. That is because "[t]ypically, wetlands are filled in order to convert them
into areas more suitable for shopping malls, housing developments, parking lots, and industry,"
therefore the regulation of wetlands will in most cases satisfy the "economic activity" requirement.
Id. at 951-52.
95. Marsh, 740 F.2d at 803.
96. Id at 803-04.
97. 999 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1993).

98. Id at 732.
99. Id at 721-25.

100. Id. at 732.
101. Id. Compare33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2001) (defining "all otherwaters"), with 33 C.F.R.

§ 328.3(a)(7) (2001) (defining "adjacent wetlands").
102. United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719,733 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface
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The court stated that it would "uphold [the] application of the [Corps'
provision] if there is] a 'rational basis' for the congressional determination
that the regulated activity 'affects interstate commerce,' and if the means
chosen to regulate the activity are reasonable."'0 3
Applying a rational basis standard, the court held that the defendants'
discharge of fill into wetlands adjacent to navigable waters without a
section 404(a) permit violated the CWA.'0 Specifically, the court held that
"where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach
of the federal [commerce] power, the courts have no power to excise as
trivial individual instances of the class." ' 5 Thus, the court held that
because the defendants' discharge of fill material into wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters is a regulated "class,"' affecting interstate commerce, 0 7
a site-specific affect on interstate commerce was not necessary.'0 8
The Third Circuit's decision, although upholding the Corps' assertion
ofjurisdiction over adjacent wetlands, drew a distinction between a "sitespecific affect" and a "class affect" on interstate commerce. Thus, unlike
Marsh, where the Tenth Circuit held that the Corps could regulate an
intrastate lake under section 404(a) if its degradation "could well have a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce,"' ' 9 the Third Circuit's
decision seems to require a "site-specific affect" on interstate commerce
for "all other waters."" 0 However, in an expansive reading upholding the
Corps' MBR, the Seventh Circuit set the necessary affect on interstate
commerce somewhere between the Tenth Circuit's "could affect" and the
Third Circuit's "site-specific affect" rule."'

Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981)).
103. Id. (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276).
104. Id. at 734.
105. Id.(citation omitted) (citing Perezv. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) and quoting
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968)).
106. 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(7) (defining "adjacent wetlands"). The destruction of "adjacent
wetlands" falls within the class of "waters of the United States," as defined by the Corps in 33
C.F.R. 328.3(a)(7) (2001), that substantially affect interstate commerce. Pozsgai,999 F.2d at 733.
107. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 733.
108. See id. at 734.
109. Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 803 (10th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
110. Pozsgai,999 F.2d at 732 (distinguishing the Corps' regulation of an intrastate lake from
adjacent wetlands and stating that a site specific impact on interstate commerce is a requirement for
regulating isolated wetlands); see also Dennis J. Priolo, Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: The
Casefor Expansion of FederalJurisdictionOver Isolated Wetlands, 30 LAND & WATER L. REv.
91, 108-09 (1995) (discussing whether a "site specific affect" is necessary for the Corps to assert
jurisdiction over "isolated wetlands").
111. See Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 999 F.2d 256,262 (7th Cir. 1993)
(Hoffman Homes V).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss1/3

12

Lammens: Section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act: The Army Corps of Engineer

Army Corps of Engineers'Jurisdiction Over "All Other Waters"

3. Migratory Bird Rule
In Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency," 2 the Corps exercised its section 404(a) jurisdiction over two
wetlands, Area A and Area B. 1 3 Each wetland was being filled by
Petitioner without a section 404(a) permit.1 1 4 Petitioner conceded that Area
B, an adjacent wetland, was subject to section 404(a), 1" but challenged the
Corps' jurisdiction to regulate Area A, an isolated, intrastate body of
water." 6 After extensive litigation,117 the Seventh Circuit issued a decisive
ruling on the Corps' jurisdiction over isolated wetlands, falling within the
definition of "all other waters" and the Corps' MBR."'
Initially, the Seventh Circuit vacated the EPA's assessment of a
$50,000 fine on Hoffman for filling Area A without apermit."9 The EPA's
Chief Judicial Officer assessed the fine after concluding that the
degradation of Area A could have a substantial affect on interstate
commerce because it "provided 'a suitable habitat for migratory birds
before it was filled in."" 2 In Hoffman Homes III, the court held that the
EPA's assertion of jurisdiction over isolated wetlands went beyond the
scope of both the CWA and the Commerce Clause.' However, upon
request for rehearing by the EPA, the court vacated Hoffman Homes III,
and provided for settlement negotiations. 22 The negotiations failed, 2 3 and

112. 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
113. Id. at258.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 259.
116. Id. at260.
117. Id. at258-61.
118. Id. at 261-62.
119. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 961 F.2d 1310, 1321-23 (7th Cir.
1992) (Hoffman Homes III); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(1)(A) (2001) (stating that "[w]henever
on the basis of any information available.., the Administrator [of the EPA] finds that any person
has violated section 301 [section 1311]" the Administrator may assess a fine); 33 U.S.C. §
1319(g)(1)(B) (providing the Secretary of the Corps with the same authority to assess fines as the
EPA); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2) (limiting the amount ofthe fine the Administrator and the Secretary

may assess).
120. Hoffman Homes V, 999 F.2d at 259 (quoting Hoffman Group Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, No. 88 C 6695, 1989 WL 165265, at *20003, (N.D.IlI. Jan. 23, 1989)); see also 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(g)(1)(A) (granting the Administrator of the EPA the authority to assess fines).
121. Hoffman Homes III, 961 F.2d at 1321.
122. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 975 F.2d 1554, 1554 (7th Cir. 1992)
(Hoffman Homes IV).
123. Hoffman Homes V, 999 F.2d at 259-60; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(8)(B) (providing
judicial review for fines assessed).
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in Hoffman Homes V, the Seventh Circuit once again reviewed the Corps'
jurisdiction under section 404(a). 24
Under section 309, judicial review, the court began its analysis of the
Corps' section 404(a) jurisdiction over isolated wetlands and its MBR.'25
First, the court held that the Corps' exercise of jurisdiction must be
supported by "substantial evidence."' 26 Then, significantly, the court held
that "the use of the word 'could' [in the Corps' definition of all other
waters] indicates [that] the regulation covers waters whose connection to
interstate commerce may be potential,ratherthan actual,minimal rather
2
than substantial."'27 Ultimately, the court upheld the Corps' MBR..1 1
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit held that "it is reasonable to interpret
the regulation [over isolated wetlands] as allowing migratory birds to be
that connection between a wetland and interstate commerce."' 2 9 However,
in the instant case, the court held that the Corps did not have the authority
to regulate Area A because it failed to establish "substantial evidence" that
"Area A was suitable for migratory bird habitat."' 3 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit established the principal that the Corps could regulate isolated
wetlands if substantial evidence established that the isolated wetland was,
or could be, a suitable habitat for migratory birds.'31
In a concurring opinion, Judge Manion challenged the Seventh Circuit's
expansive reading of section 404(a) jurisdiction.'32 Judge Manion stated
that "the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to regulate
isolated wetlands such as Area A."' 33 Specifically, Judge Manion stated
that "[tihe Commerce power as construed by the courts is indeed
expansive, but not so expansive as to authorize regulation of puddles
merely because
a bird traveling interstate might decide to stop for a
134
drink."'
Judge Manion's argument, however, is unfounded. The majority's
opinion in Hoffman Homes V upheld the Corps' authority to regulate
isolated wetlands. However, contrary to Judge Manion's contention, the

124. Hoffman Homes V, 999 F.2d at 258-60.
125. Id. at 259-60.
126. Id. at 260; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(8)(B) (requiring substantial evidence to support
the issuance of fines).
127. Hoffman Homes V, 999 F.2d at 261 (emphasis added); see 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)
(defining "all other waters" as waters that "could affect interstate or foreign commerce").
128. Hoffman Homes V, 999 F.2d at 261.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 262.
131. Id. at 260-62. But see id. at 262-63 (Manion, J., concurring) (arguing that the Commerce
Clause should not be construed to be as expansive as the majority's opinion).
132. Id. at 263 (Manion, J., concurring).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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Corps does not define wetlands as puddles. Rather, the Corps defines
wetlands as "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or
ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that
under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions[;] [w]etlands generally
include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.""13 Specifically, the
Corps defines "isolated wetlands" as "those non-tidal waters ofthe United
States that are: (1) Not part of a surface tributary system to interstate or
navigable waters of the United States; and (2) Not adjacent to such
tributary waterbodies."' 36 Thus, Judge Manion's fear of regulated puddles
is groundless. Judge Manion wrongly concluded that a reading of section
404(a) to include the regulation of isolated waters violated the Commerce
Clause.
In an equally expansive reading, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Corps'
exercise of section 404(a) jurisdiction over isolated wetlands as justified
by its MBR. 3 7 Initially, in Leslie Salt Co. v. UnitedStates (LeslieSalt 1), 138
the district court held that the Corps could not exercise section 404(a)
jurisdiction over artificially created and only seasonally ponded
wetlands. 139 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that artificially created and
seasonally ponded wetlands could fall within the Corps' definition of "all
other waters."' 40 In Leslie Salt 11, the court held that "[t]he [C]ommerce
[C]lause power, and thus the Clean Water Act, is broad enough to extend
the Corps' jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to
migratory birds and endangered species."'' On remand, in Leslie Salt Co.
v. UnitedStates (Leslie Salt 111), 142 the district court found that, inter alia,
because migratory birds used the seasonally ponded wetlands, filling them
without a section 404(a) permit violated section 301.'
At issue in Leslie Salt IV, ' was whether the Leslie Salt I1 court
correctly held that the "[CWA] reaches isolated waters used only by
migratory birds.' 45 In reviewing the Leslie Salt 11 court's decision, the

135. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2001).
136. 33 C.F.R. § 330.2(e) (2001).
137. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir. 1995) (Leslie Salt IV).
138. 700 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (Leslie Salt I).
139. Id. at 485-86.
140. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 359-60 (9th Cir. 1990) (Leslie Salt II); see
also Edward Alburo Morrissey, LegislativeReform: The Jurisdictionofthe Clean WaterAct Over
IsolatedWetlands: The MigratoryBirdRule,22 J. LEGIs. 137, 139-42 (1996) (discussing theNinth
Circuit's analysis of the MBR).
141. Leslie Salt 11, 896 F.2d at 360.
142. 820 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (Leslie Salt III).
143. Seeid. at 482.
144. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995) (Leslie Salt IV).
145. Id.
at 1392.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 3

FLORIDA LAW REVI.EW

[Vol. 54

instant court adopted a "clearly erroneous" standard. 146 Under the court's
"clearly erroneous" standard, the court first dismissed the argument that the
MBR was inapplicable because it was not subjeet to "notice and comment"
as required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).147 Specifically, the
court held that the Leslie Salt Il court's implicit adoption of the MBR was
reasonable because "the migratory bird examples in thepreamble could
also be seen as merely an interpretation
of the [CWA] as opposed to a
148
substantive addition to its reach.
The court next addressed the reasonableness ofthe Leslie Salt 11 court's
MBR holding. 149 Citing five specific grounds (the CWA's language,
policy, legislative history, Riverside, and, Hoffman Homes), the court held
that the Leslie Salt II decision "[could not] be considered clearly
erroneous."' 50 First, the court held that although there is no language in the
CWA including the exercise of jurisdiction over isolated wetlands, the
policy language of the CWA does allow for the inclusion of isolated
wetlands within the ambit of section 404(a) jurisdiction. Specifically, the
court held that the "[CWA's] policy of protecting wildlife could plausibly
be read to stretch this far." 5' Next, the court held that the CWA's
legislative history allows for the inclusion of isolated wetlands under the
Corps' section 404(a) jurisdiction.152 That is, the court held that the
legislative history implies that Congress intended the CWA to exercise the
"maximum extent" of federal power permissible under the Commerce
Clause.53

146. Id. at 1393.
147. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2001) (providing rulemaking requirements under the
Administrative Procedures Act).
148. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1394. But see Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp.
726, 727-29 (E.D. Va. 1988) (holding the Corps' Kelly Memorandum invalid for lack of "notice
and comment" consistent with the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act). "An
interpretive rule is one that merely explains 'what the administrative officer thinks the statute or
regulation means."' Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1393 (quoting Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 613
(9th Cir. 1984)). Under section 553 of the Administrative Procedures Act, interpretive rules need
not be subject to notice or hearing unless required by statute. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A).
149. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1394-96.
150. Id. at 1394-95.
151. Id. Section 101 (a) of the CWA states that "it is the national goal that wherever attainable,
an interim goal of water quality which provides for the protection and propagation offish, shellfish,
and wildlife.. . be achieved." 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(2).
152. Leslie Salt lV, 55 F.2d at 1394-95.
153. Id.
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Finally, the court cited Riverside'54 andHoffman Homes V' for support
of the MBR's reasonableness. 156 In Riverside the Supreme Court upheld
the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands.1 57 Relying on
Riverside, the instant court held that "the Corps' rationale for regulating
adjacent wetlands may have some applicationto isolated waters as well."'58
That is, the court held that "[tihe seasonally ponded areas may have a
connection to the aquatic ecosystem in their role as habitat for migratory
birds.' ' 159 And, relying on Hoffman Homes V, the instant court held that "it
is reasonable to interpret the Act as allowing migratory birds to be the
connection between a wetland and interstate commerce."160 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the MBR was reasonable, and therefore valid.' 6'
Lastly, the court addressed whether the MBR fell within the scope of
the Commerce Clause. 6 The court held specifically that the Commerce
Clause does extend to the MBR.163 Citing Hughes v. Oklahoma164 and
Palilav. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources165 for the
proposition that the regulation of wildlife falls within the ambit of the
Commerce Clause,116 the court held that "given the broad sweep of the
Commerce Clause, the holding in Leslie Salt II cannot be considered
clearly erroneous on this ground."'167 The Ninth Circuit thus held that the
Corps' application of the MBR fell within the scope of the Commerce
Clause.
Therefore, undera Leslie Salt 1V analysis and consistent with Hoffman
Homes V, the Corps has jurisdiction to regulate any water body or wetland
falling within the definition of "all other waters" as defined by the MBR
if, at a minimum, the site is actually used by migratory birds.

154. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. v. United States, 474 U.S. 121 (1985); see infra notes
177-99 and accompanying text.
155. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993)
(Hoffman Homes V); see also supra notes 113-32 and accompanying text.
156. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1395.
157. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 139.
158. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1395.
159. ld (emphasis added).
160. Id. In Hoffman Homes V, the Seventh Circuit held that it was "reasonable to interpret the
regulation as allowing migratory birds to be that connection between a wetland and interstate
commerce." Hoffman Homes V, 999 F.2d at 261.
161. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1395-96.
162. Id.
163. d at 1395.
164. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
165. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979).
166. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1396.
167. Id.
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Unlike the Ninth' and Seventh Circuits,'69 however, in UnitedStates
v. Wilson, 7 ' the Fourth Circuit was not as generous in its reading of the
Corps' section 404(a) jurisdiction. In a short but significant analysis, the
court invalidated the Corps' regulation governing "[a]ll other waters...
which could affect interstate or foreign commerce."'' Specifically, the
court held that although the "power of Congress to regulate the discharge
of pollutants into at least some nonnavigable waters is indisputable,"172 the
CWA does not authorize the Corps to extend its jurisdiction to include
"waters that are intrastate, nonnavigable, or both, solely on the basis that
the use, degradation or destruction of such waters could affect interstate
commerce."173 Thus, contrary to precedent, 74 the court held that the Corps'
exercise ofjurisdiction over "all other waters,"
"exceeded its congressional
75
Act.'
Water
Clean
the
under
authorization
It is at least arguable, however, that if the Corps' regulations required
an "actual," that is, "site specific" affect on interstate commerce, then the
Fourth Circuit would have held otherwise. 76
' In any event, given the Fourth
Circuit's restrictive reading of section 404(a), it appears that the Corps has
no authority to regulate "all other waters" within the Fourth Circuit.
B. Jurisdictionand CongressionalIntent
In 1976, Riverside Bayview Homes, Incorporated, began to place fill
material on wetlands adjacent to "waters of the United States" as defined
by the Corps' regulations. 77 The Corps exercised its section 404(a)
jurisdiction over the adjacent wetlands and Riverside Bayview Homes

168. Id. at 1395-96 (stating that migratory birds can satisfy the necessary connection between
"all other waters" and interstate commerce).
169. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993)
(Hoffman Homes V) (stating that migratory birds can satisfy the necessary connection between "all
other waters" and interstate commerce).
170. 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
171. Id. at 257 (emphasis added) (invalidating 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)).
172. Id. at256.
173. Id. at257.
174. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1395-96 (9th Cir. 1995) (Leslie Salt IV);
Hoffman Homes V, 999 F.2d at 261; Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799,803-04 (10th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1210-11 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp.
665, 673-74 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
175. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257; see also Christopher N. Challis, Comment, StandingAlone in
Murky Waters: Evaluatingthe FourthCircuit'sSolitary Stance on FederalWetlands Regulation,
34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1179, 1179-84 (1999) (discussing the Fourth Circuit's lone stance on
invalidating the Corps' assertion over "all other waters").
176. See supranote 173 and accompanying text.
177. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985); see also 33
C.F.R. § 323.2 (1982) (replaced by 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2001)).
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promptly challenged the Corps' jurisdictional interpretation.'78 After years
of litigation,'79 the Supreme Court "granted certiorari to consider the
proper interpretation of the Corps' regulation defining 'waters of the
United States'80 and the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction under the Clean
Water Act."'
In Riverside, the Court focused its discussion on two of the Corps' main
arguments for an expansive reading ofits jurisdiction: one, the Corps asked
the Court for deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources
Defense Council,Inc.;. and, two, the Corps asked the Court to consider
congressional acquiescence."8 2 Under its deference analysis the Court first
held, that "[a]n agency's construction of a statute it is charged with
enforcing is entitled to deference if it is reasonable and not in conflict with
the expressed intent of Congress."'8 Thus, like the Ninth Circuit in Leslie
Salt IV, the Court considered the language, policies, and legislative
history of the CWA in order to determine whether the Corps' jurisdictional
interpretation was reasonable and within the ambit of the CWA.8 5
Under its deference analysis, the Court concluded that neither the
legislative history nor the policies of the CWA provide unambiguous
guidance for the Corps to determine "the bounds of its regulatory
authority."' 81 6 Rather, the Court concluded that both the legislative history
and the policies of the CWA "support the reasonableness of the Corps'
approach of defining adjacent wetlands as 'waters' within the meaning of
[section] 404(a)."'8 7 Specifically, the Court reasoned that: one, the goal of
the CWA, to restore and maintain the nation's waters;' 88 two,
congressional recognition that "broad federal authority" is necessary to
control water pollution; 9 three, the "limited import" of the use of the term
"navigable" within the CWA; 90 and, four, the Corps' determination that

178. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 124-25.
179. Id. at 124-26.
180. Id. at 126.
181. Id. at 131-35; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837,842-45 (1984). For an analysis of Chevron and its application, see generally Cass R. Sunstein,
Law andAdministrationAfter Chevron, 90 COLuM. L. REv. 2071 (1990).
182. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 135-39.
183. Id at 131.
184. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1395 (9th Cir. 1995).
185. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 131.
186. Id.at 132.

187. Id.
188. Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2001).
189. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 132-33 (citing S. REP. No. 92-414, at 77 (1972)).
190. Id. at 133. Specifically, the Court stated that "Congress evidently intended to repudiate
limits that had been placed on federal regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes and to
exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulateatleast some waters that would not be
deemed 'navigable' under the classical understanding of that term." Id. (emphasis added).
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adjacent wetlands are crucial in "protecting and enhancing water
quality"; 91 provide sufficient evidence for it to conclude that the Corps'
judgment of these matters is reasonable. 92 Thus, the Court held that "a
definition of 'waters of the United States' encompassing all wetlands
adjacent to other bodies of water over which the Corps has jurisdiction is
a permissible interpretation of the Act."' 93
Next, in addition to granting the Corps deference, the Court held that
in 1977 Congress acquiesced to the Corps' interpretation of its jurisdiction
to include adjacent wetlands.' 94 Under its acquiescence analysis, the Court
discussed a House bill introduced to limit the Corps' jurisdiction under
section 404(a)19 and a congressional debate concerning the limitations
introduced by the bill.' 6 Ultimately, however, the amendment to limit the
Corps' jurisdiction was defeated, and the Corps' originaljurisdictionunder
the CWA was retained.' 97 Thus, the Court held that "a refusal by Congress
to overrule an agency's construction of legislation is at least some evidence
of the reasonableness of that construction, particularly where the
administrative construction has been brought to Congress' attention
through legislation specifically designed to supplant it."' 98 Thus, the Court
held that because Congress had knowledge of the Corps' expansive
exercise of its section 404(a) jurisdiction, but refused to limit it, Congress
acquiesced.
Therefore, in Riverside, the Court effectively held that the Corps could
exercise section 404(a) jurisdiction within the reasonable bounds of the
CWA. Thus, under a Riverside analysis, the Corps could seemingly
exercise its jurisdiction over "all other waters" if the exercise is deemed
reasonable. Since federal case law supports the Corps' exercise of
jurisdiction over waters falling within the definition of "all other
waters, ' 99 it is at least arguable that the Corps' exercise of jurisdiction
over "all other waters" is reasonable and thus, within its section 404(a)
jurisdiction.2"'

191. Id.
192. Id. at 135.
193. Id. The Court specifically stated that its opinion did not address the Corps' asserted
jurisdiction to regulate isolated wetlands. Id. at 131 n.8.
194. Id. at 135-36.
195. Id. at 136-37 (discussing H.R..3199, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 16 (1977) and a proposal
in the Senate supporting a limitation of the Corps' section 404(a) jurisdiction contained in 123
Cong. Rec. 26,710-11 (1977)).
196. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 136-37.
197. Id.(discussing Senator Baker at 123 Cng. Rec. 39,209 (1977)).
198. Id.at 137.
199. See supra note 174.
200. See Geltman, supranote 63, at 643.
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IV. AN EXAMINATION OF SOLID WASTEAGENCY V. U.S.
ARMY CORPS OFENGINEERS

However, in its only decision directly addressing the Corps' regulations
governing isolated, intrastate waters under "all other waters," the Supreme
Court effectively limited the Corps' reading of its section 404(a)
jurisdiction."' Unlike its decision in Riverside, the Court held that
deference could not be granted, Congress had not acquiesced, and thus,
that the Corps' regulations exceeded the scope of the CWA. °2
The SWANCC purchased a gravel mining site for the disposal of its
nonhazardous solid waste. 0 3 The site had not been used for approximately
three decades and had given way to permanent and seasonal ponds used by
migratory birds.2° The Corps refused the SWANCC's request for a section
404(a) permit to fill the ponds based, in part, on the presence of migratory
birds. 0 5 As a result, SWANCC challenged both the Corps' jurisdiction to
regulate isolated waters "based upon the presence of migratory birds" and
whether the migratory bird regulation fell within the scope of the
Commerce Clause. 0 6 In a decisive opinion that overturned the Corps' 1986
"Migratory Bird Rule," the Court held that "the 'Migratory Bird Rule' is
not fairly supportedby the CWA."2' 7
First, the Courf distinguished the adjacent wetlands addressed in
Riverside from the isolated, intrastate waters at issue in the instant case.20 8
The Court held that in Riverside, it was the "significant nexus between the
[adj acent] wetlands and 'navigable waters[,]' that informed" its conclusion
that adjacent wetlands fell within the scope of section 404(a)
jurisdiction.20 9 That is, in Riverside, the Court held that the adjacent
wetlands' connection to "navigable waters" satisfied the necessary
connection to interstate commerce.
Distinguishing Riverside, the Court held, however, that the text of the
CWA, unlike its application to adjacent wetlands, does not allow for the
Corps to exercise jurisdiction over non-adjacent waters with only a
migratory bird connection to interstate commerce.210 The Court reasoned
that although the text of the CWA could be interpreted to extend section

201. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 162 (2001).
202. Id. at 170, 172.
203. IM.at 163.
204. Id. at 162-63.
205. Id. at 164-65.
206. Id. at 165-66.
207. Id. at 167. Because the Court invalidated the Corps' regulation, it never reached the
Commerce Clause issue. Id at 162.
208. Id. at 167-68.
209. Id.at 167.
210. Id. at 167-68.
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404(a) jurisdiction to adjacent wetlands with a "significant nexus" to
"navigable waters," and thus to interstate commerce, it could not be read
to extend section 404(a) jurisdiction to isolated wetlands with a connection
to interstate commerce solely by migratory birds.21' The Court therefore
implied that isolated, intrastate waters, unlike adjacent wetlands, lacked the
necessary connection to "navigable waters" and thus to interstate
commerce.
Next, unlike Riverside, the Court refused the Corps' argument that
Congress acquiesced to its expansive reading of section 404(a) jurisdiction
when Congress failed to amend the definition of "navigable waters"
pursuant to the 1977 amendments.212 That is, the Corps argued that because
Congress was aware of its jurisdictional exercise over "waters 'other than'
traditional 'navigable waters,"' Congress acquiesced when it declined to
limit the Corps' jurisdiction in 1977.213 The Court held, however, that the
failure of the House bill intended to limit the Corps' section 404(a)
jurisdiction was insufficient evidence of congressional acquiescence.214
Thus, the Court held that Congress did not acquiesce to the Corps'
regulations covering "all other waters." 215
Lastly, also unlike Riverside, the Court refused to grant the Corps
deference.216 The Corps argued that section 404(a) did not "address the
precise question of [section] 404(a)'s scope with regard to nonnavigable,
isolated, intrastate waters, and that, therefore, [the Court] should give
deference to the 'Migratory Bird Rule.' 217 The Court, however, held that
section 404(a) was not ambiguous with respect to non-navigable, isolated
waters, and thus withheld deference.2"' That is, the Court stated that the
plain text of section 404(a) clearly did not extend to non-navigable,
isolated wetlands as defined by the MBR. -19 Specifically, the Court
reasoned that although the use of the term "navigable" in section 404(a) is
of limited scope, to hold that the Corps could regulate isolated, nonnavigable waters, with only a migratory bird connection to interstate
commerce would leave the term "navigable" without any effect at all.220

211. Id. InRiverside, the Court held that because adjacent wetlands as a class have a
"significant [effect] on water quality and the aquatic ecosystem," each adjacent wetland need not
be of "great importance." United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135 n.9
(1985).
212. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 170.
213. Id.at 169.
214. Id.at 170.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 172-74.
217. Id. at 172.
218. Id.
219. Id.at 167,172.
220. Id. at 172.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss1/3

22

Lammens: Section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act: The Army Corps of Engineer
20021

Army Corps ofEngineers'JurisdictionOver "All Other Waters"

Additionally, the Court stated that even if ambiguity existed it would
not have granted deference. 1 Specifically, the Court stated that where an
administrative regulation "invokes the outer limits of Congress' power" as
the MBR does in the instant case, there must be "a clear indication that
Congress intended that result."' Thus, because the Corps' regulation of
"ponds and mudflats falling within the 'Migratory Bird Rule' would result
in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power
over land and water use ' and, because the Corps failed to show a clear
congressional intent to test the limit of the Commerce Clause, the Court
held that deference would not have been granted.224
The Court in SWANCC, therefore, effectively limited the Corps'
exercise of jurisdiction over "all other waters." Specifically, the Court
invalidated the Corps' 1986 "Migratory Bird Rule" and left uncertain the
scope of the Corps' section 404(a) jurisdiction over "all other waters."
V. CURRENT READING OF SECTION 404(a)

At a minimum, SWANCC can be read to limit the Corps' regulation of
"all other waters" pursuant only to the MBR. In SWANCC, the Court
specifically stated that, "[w]e hold that 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1999), as
clarifiedandappliedtopetitioner's balefill sitepursuantto the 'Migratory
Bird Rule,' . . . exceeds the authority granted to respondents under
[section] 404(a) of the CWA." 25 If SWANCC is read in light of this
language, then, consistent with case law,226 the Corps could regulate "all
other waters" so long as migratory birds are not the sole nexus to interstate
commerce.
For example, in Byrd and Marsh the courts held, at a minimum, that
activities that have a "substantial economic affect" on interstate commerce
can serve as the necessary nexus between the site to be regulated by the
Corps and interstate commerce.227 And, although there is no clear
consensus between the circuit courts as to whether an actual or potential
affect on interstate commerce is necessary to establish the nexus between

221. Id.
222. Id.(holding that clear congressional intent is necessary when the outer limits of the
Commerce Clause is tested) (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
223. Id. at 174; see also United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (stating that
federalism issues raise the concern for congressional clarity).
224. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172.
225. Idat 174 (emphasis added).
226. See supranote 174 and accompanying text.
227. United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1210 (7th Cir. 1979); Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d
799, 803 (10th Cir. 1984).
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the site to be regulated and interstate commerce, 228 at a minimum, it is
arguable that an actual affect on interstate commerce is sufficient. 229 Thus,
under an analysis giving SWANCC a limited affect, the Corps could
regulate an isolated, intrastate water body if it not only served as a habitat
for migratory birds, but also served as a fishing area for interstate travelers,
for example.230
Justice Stevens, however, interpreted the majority's opinion to limit the
Corps' ability to regulate "all other waters" at all under the CWA.23' In
fact, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens expressly stated that "the
Court draws a new jurisdictional line, one that invalidates the 1986
migratory bird regulation as well as the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction
over all waters except for actuallynavigable waters,their tributaries,and
wetlands adjacent to each."' 2
A close analysis of the Court's language in SWANCC seems to support
Justice Stevens' interpretation that the majority's opinion prohibits the
Corps from exercising section 404(a) jurisdiction over "all other waters"
at all. For example, in declining to extend Riverside'sexpansive reasoning,
the Court held that the text of the CWA does not allow the Corps to extend
'' 3
its jurisdiction to "ponds that are not adjacent to open water. 2
Specifically, the Court stated that, "[i]n order to rule for respondents here,
we would have to hold that the jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds
that are not adjacent to open water"234 and "we conclude that the text of the
statute will not allow this. ' ' "
In addition, in a textual analysis of the CWA, the Court held that
although the phrase "navigable" has been given limited effect, 6 it is not
without effect altogether.237 Specifically, the Court stated that "[tihe term
'navigable' has at least the import of showing us what Congress had in
mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over
waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably
be so made., 23' Applying the same reasoning "to avoid the significant

228. Compare Byrd, 609 F.2d at 1210, and Marsh, 740 F.2d at 803, with United States v.
Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 732-34 (3d Cir. 1993).
229. See cases cited supra note 228.
230. See Marsh, 740 F.2d at 803-04.
231. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 227-28 (2001)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
232. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
233. Id. at 168 (emphasis in original).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 172; see, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 13334 (1985); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 655, 671-72 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
237. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172.
238. Id.
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constitutional and federalism questions" that would be raised if the Corps'
regulations over isolated waters were held valid, the Court held that the
text of the CWA does not extend to nonnavigable, intrastate waters.239
However, given the structure of the Corps' regulations and the issue
sought to be resolved in SWANCC, it is clear that the Court did not
effectively prohibit the Corps from regulating "all other waters" at all.
Rather, the majority's opinion in SWANCC can be read to prohibit the
Corps' use of the MBR as the sole nexus to "interstate commerce. 240 In
other words, in light ofSWANCC, the Corps cannot use the MBR to satisfy
the "could affect interstate.., commerce" requirement of the "[a]ll other
waters" provision as defined by "waters of the United States. 24 '
Specifically, at issue in SWANCC was whether the Corps could use the
MBR to extend the definition of"navigable waters," defined as "the waters
of the United States," 242 to "all other waters" 243 merely because the waters
sought to be regulated served as a habitat for migratory birds. 2 " The Court
held on the issue of extending the definition of "navigable waters" to "all
other waters," as defined by the MBR, that the MBR could not be used to
bring effectively "all other waters" under the definition of "waters of the
United States." 245 That is, the Court specifically held that the MBR "was
not fairly supported by the CWA. 246 Thus, although the Court held that the
MBR could not be used to bring "all other waters" within the scope of the
Corps' section 404(a) jurisdiction, it did not hold, contrary to the
dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens,247 that the Corps could not regulate
"all other waters" at all.
The effect of the majority's opinion in SWANCC, however, is, in part,
consistent with Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion. That is, although
SWANCC does not prohibit the Corps from regulating "all other waters"
at all, the Court does effectively remove potentially twenty percent of our
nation's waters and wetlands, that were previously
defined as "waters of
248
the United States," from the Corps' authority.
For example, prior to SWANCC, the Corps used the MBRto satisfy the
necessary connection between "all other waters" and interstate

239. Ma at 174.
240. See id.
241. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2001) (stating that "all other waters" includes waters that
"could affect interstate ...commerce").

242. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2001).
243. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).
244. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 165-66; Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of
Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
245. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 176-77 (Stevens, J.dissenting).
248. Greenhouse, supra note 22, at A13.
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commerce;2 49 the Corps applied the MBR to those areas with no other
direct connection to interstate commerce.25 Thus, as a result of SWANCC
"[a]ll other waters such as intrastate... mudflats, sandflats, wetlands,
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, [and] natural
ponds""1 which have migratory birds as their sole connection to interstate
commerce are now effectively outside the scope of the Corps' section
404(a) jurisdiction.
VI. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE

CWA

In order to ensure that the Corps has the authority under section 404(a)
of the CWA to regulate "all other waters," including waters with only a
"migratory bird connection" to interstate commerce, Congress could
amend the CWA." 2 That is, because the Court's holding in SWANCC is
only a textual interpretation of whether the MBR is within the scope of the
CWA," 3 an amendment to the CWA, consistent with federal case law,
could unambiguously expand the Corps' jurisdiction to include "all other
waters' ' 254 connected to interstate commerce by, inter alia, migratory
birds. 55
For example, in order to ensure the Corps' jurisdiction over "all other
waters" including those connected to interstate commerce only by
migratory birds, Congress could delete the problematic phrase "navigable

249. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1995) (Leslie Salt IV);
Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 999 F.2d 256,261-62 (7th Cir. 1993) (Hoffman
Homes V).
250. It could be argued that in addition to providing habitat for migratory birds, isolated
wetlands perform, for example, a significant ecological function sufficient to satisfy the interstate
commerce connection. See Bueschan, supra note 22, at 953-61. However, whether the "significant
ecological function" argument is sufficient to establish the necessary nexus to interstate commerce
is beyond the scope of this Note.
251. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).
252. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162 (stating that because the CWA does not extend to waters
connected to interstate commerce by migratory birds, it is unnecessary to decide whether Congress
could extend the CWA to include such waters); see also id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating
that although the majority opinion did not address the Commerce Clause issue, "[tihe Corps'
exercise of its [section] 404 permitting power over 'isolated' waters that serve as habitat for
migratory birds falls well within the boundaries set by this Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence"); Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1394-95 (stating that the Corps' MBR is within the scope
of the Commerce Clause); Hoffman Homes V, 999 F.2d at 261-62 (stating that the Corps' MBR is
within the scope of the Commerce Clause).
253. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168.
254. See id.

255. See supranote 252 and accompanying text.
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' in section 404(a).57 and replace it with the phrase "waters of the
waters"256
United States." Then, in the definition section of the CWA as the
definition of "waters of the United States," Congress could adopt the
Corps' current definition of "waters ofthe United States"2 59 but amend the
"all other waters" provision to include the MBR. 26' As a result, Congress
could clearly express its intent to extend the Corps' section 404(a)
jurisdiction beyond any "navigability" restriction.26'
In other words, an amendment to the CWA could unambiguously define
the scope of "waters of the United States" to not only include adjacent
wetlands 262 and waters traditionally defined by the Corps2 63 but also "all
other waters," including non-adjacent, intrastate waters and wetlands.2 4
Thus, under an amended CWA, for example, the Corps would have
jurisdiction over the gravel pits at issue in SWANCC. That is, under an
amended CWA, the Corps could regulate the discharge of dredged or fill
material into a water body falling within the definition of "waters of the
United States" if,for example, the water body was used by migratory birds.

VII. CONCLUSION

Absent an amendment to the CWA, however, the Corps may, at a
minimum, exercise its section 404(a) jurisdiction over "all other waters"
only ifthere is substantial evidence 265 to support a finding that the dredging
or filling of an area will have a substantial economic affect on interstate
commerce 66 by a means other than migratory birds. 267 That is, absent an
amendment to the CWA, the Corps could exercise its regulatory authority
over a non-adjacent, intrastate lake, used by interstate travelers for

256. CompareUnited Statesv. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,133-36 (1985),
with SWANCC, 581 U.S. at 169-71.

257. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2001).
258. 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2001).
259. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2001).
260. See Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1394-95; Hoffman Homes V, 999 F.2d at 261-62; see also
Morrissey, supra note 140, at 143-44 (proposing an amendment to section 404(a) to expressly
include waters used by migratory birds).
261. CompareRiverside, 474 U.S. at 133-36, andUnited States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665,
671 (M.D. Fla. 1974), with SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 169-71.

262. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(2) (2001).
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1).
See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3).
See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text; see also Geltman, supranote 63, at 643.
Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. at 159, 174 (2001).
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regulate a nonrecreation,268 but, consistent with SWANCC, it could not
2 69
adjacent, intrastate pond, used only by migratory birds.

268. See, e.g., Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 803-04 (10th Cir. 1984).
269. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
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